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STATE OF UTAH 
DARREN J. POLLICK, by and 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11880 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries to Darren J. 
Pollick, resulting from a fall over a bannister surrounding 
a stairwell in the J. C. Penney Store located at 4849 South 
State Street, Murray, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Marcellus K. 
Snow, sitting with a jury. From a verdict and judgment 
for the plaintiff, defendant appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and judg-
ment in its favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the morning of May 5, 1964, John R. Pollick went 
to the J. C. Penney store at 4849 South State Street, Mur-
ray, Utah to purchase a Mother's Day gift (R. 122). He 
took his three-year-old son, Darren Pollick, with him to 
the store (R. 123). Mr. Pollick had been in the store a 
number of prior occasions (R. 133). He had taken his son 
shopping with him before (R. 123). Mr. Pollick knew there 
were stairs from the main floor to the basement floor 
(R. 134). 
Mr. Pollick shopped for five or ten minutes before he 
found a dress he wanted to buy (R. 125). Mr. Pollick had 
Darren "in hand" most of the time while he was shopping 
(R. 125). The saleslady proceeded to write up the charge 
ticket and put the dress in a box (R. 126). While Mr. Pol-
lick was checking the sales slip and signing it, Darren 
walked away from him (R. 126). The next thing Mr. Pol-
lick heard was crying, screaming and commotion coming 
from the center of the store (R. 127). Mr. Pollick walked 
toward the stair casing and saw Mr. Barlocker, a Penney 
employee, carrying Darren up the stairs (R. 128). Al-
though no one saw Darren fall, it is assumed that he climbed 
over the bannister surrounding the stairwell and fell eleven 
feet to a display table on the basement floor (R. 129, 152). 
Darren suffered a broken leg from the fall (R. 114). 
The evidence presented in the lower court indicates the 
bannister over which Darren fell was a fraction under 36 
inches in height (R. 154) and had a mop board around the 
bottom that was 7% inches high and % inch wide at its 
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top (R 154). At the time of the accident the boy was short-
tX in hci, ht than the waist of his 5 foot 8 inch father 
139). 
A Mr. Lloyd M. Dalton, building inspector for Murray 
City, testified that the City had adopted the Uniform Build-
ing Code. He testified the code required the bannister around 
the stairs in the Penney store should be 86 inches in height 
( R. 173). This testimony was uncontroverted. He also testi-
fied there was nothing in the building code regarding mop 
boards (R. 176). The defendant attempted to introduce evi-
dence from Mr. Barlocker that from 1961 to 1964, while 
he worked in the store, no one had fallen over the bannister 
(R. 155). The court sustained plaintiff's objection to the 
e\'idence (R. 160). 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the defendant 
moved the court for a directed verdict (R. 157). The court 
denied the motion (R. 169). The jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff and against defendant awarding spe-
cial damages of $821.36 and general damages of $2500. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FIND-
ING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT. 
During the course of the trial the defendant moved for 
a directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff had pro-
duced no competent evidence from which the jury could 
find any negligence on behalf of the defendant, and that 
the evidence taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff 
showed that the plaintiff's minor son walked away from 
his father while he was making a purchase, climbed over 
a bannister and fell to the basement below (R. 157). The 
court denied the defendant's motion (R. 160). 
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Appellant contends that its motion for a directed 'Ver-
dict should have been gra.nted. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record that 
would indicate that the appellant was negligent in any 
manner whatsoever. There was no evidence to show that 
the bannister was negligently designed or constructed. 
There was no evidence from which the jury could find the 
mop board was improperly constructed. The evidence clear-
ly indicates that the bannister was within a fraction of an 
inch of being 3 feet in height as required by the build-
ing code (R. 154). Since there was no evidence relating to 
the design or construction of mop boards, it must be pre-
sumed that they \Vere constructed properly. The burden of 
proof was on the plaintiff to prove the defendant's negli-
gence. A finding of negligence cannot be based on specula-
tion or conjecture. 
See Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986 
(1954) where this court held: 
"The burden was upon plaintiff to prove the 
charge of speeding; such a finding of fact could not 
be based on mere speculation or conjecture, but only 
on a preponderance of the evidence. This means the 
greater weight of the evidence, or as sometimes 
stated, such degree of proof that the greater proba-
bility of truth lies therein. A choice of probabilities 
does not meet this requirement. It creates only a basis 
for co11,iecture, on which a verdict of the jury cannot 
stand . .,_ " *" (Emphasis added) 
It is elementary that before a person can recover from 
another for injuries suffered, the one from whom the 
damages are sought must be shown to have been negligent 
and further such negligence must be shown to have been 
the cause of the injury. 
In Mortensen v. First Security Bank of Utah, 12 Utah 
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2d 363 P.2d 75 ( 1961), the plaintiff had the tip of 
her thumb cut off while making a deposit in the bank's 
night depository. The jury found for the plaintiff, but 
the court granted defendant's motion for judgment N.O.V. 
In upholding the ruling of the trial court judge, Justice 
Crockett stated: 
"It is not doubted that the plaintiff injured her 
thumb, nor that it was both painful and unfortunate. 
But that provides no basis for making another pay for 
it. It is so elementary as to hardly require exposition 
that this can be done only if the defendant was at fault 
in causing the injury. Before plaintiff could recover 
she had the burden of showing that the defendant was 
guilty of negligence: that is, that by some act or omis-
sion it failed in its duty to use reasonable care for the 
safety of persons in plaintiff's situation and thereby 
exposed them to an unreasonable risk of harm." Mor-
trnsen at 77. (Emphasis added) 
This court has held that a verdict cannot stand unless 
it is supported by the evidence. In Larson v. Evans, 12 
Utah 2d 245, 364 P.2d 1088 (1961), plaintiff brought suit 
for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. At the 
trial the judge instructed the jury that the defendant was 
negligent as a matter of law for running a stop sign. The 
jury was then instructed that they might find that the 
plaintiffs were contributorily negligent. The plaintiff 
appealed from a jury verdict of no cause of action and the 
denial of a motion for a new trial. 
This court held there was insufficient evidence to sus-
tain a finding of contributory negligence and reversed the 
lower court judgment. 
Generally speaking appellate courts are reluctant to 
overturn jury verdicts. However, under certain circum-
stances, such verdicts will be overturned. 
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"The rnle that a verdict will not br distuJ'iJrd 111herc 
tl1r c1·idP11cr tends to s11m1ort it docs 11ot cnil>i'O('C 0 
rnsc wit Ne a I'Ndict has been rendered i;1 fo ror of 
plc1i11tiff in a11 act,.on a11d the record shows rrn e11tirr 
al1se11ce of evidc11('e s11;morti11r1. or te11di11g to s111n·o1·t. 
so111e material and iJ1disJJC11sable fart 1iercssa1·11 to be 
proved /J!f him to j11stif!f the 1·c11ditio11 of a ve1·dict in 
his frr ?'m·. 
"F11rthe1· it has been held that, where the ·verdict 
is mrr11if cstlu a,q01"11st the evidence, the .iudpme11t will br 
reversed 11otwithsta11di11g the trial court had refused 
to set aside the 11crdfrt. So also the ve1·dict or findings 
will not be permitted to stand where they arc direct-
ly contradictorr of, or irreconcilable with, the ;,, i-
dence 01· rest only on speculation and conjecture; or 
where the verdict is unsupported by the evidence; and 
a similar rule applies where the verdict is not support2d 
or sustained by substantial evidence, or by any evi-
dence, or is not sustained by any reasonable hypoth-
esis based on the facts proved; or where the evi-
dence is clearly insufficient as a matter of law." 5A 
C.J.S. Appeal & Error, Sec. 1647 (1958) (Emphasis 
added). 
The uncontroverted evidence shows that the bannister 
was constructed in accordance with the Uniform Building 
Code. 
The defendant called as a witness Mr. Lloyd M. Dal-
ton, \vho is a building inspector for Murray City (R. 170). 
Mr. Dalton testified that the building code required ban-
nisters of the type found in the appellant's store to be 36 
inches in height ( R. 17 4). He further testified that there 
is nothing in the code with regard to mop boards (R. 176). 
From Mr. Dalton's testimony it was clear that Penney's 
had complied in every respect with the building code. 
The plaintiff did not produce one shred of evidence to 
contradict or impeach this evidence. 
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This court has consistently held that findings against 
,1 ;1,·cq,: :·c>\"(·rted and unimpeached evidence will be set aside. 
Jn Po1 b·1 ?'. Weber County In. Dist., 68 Utah 472, 251 
P. 11 ( 1926), plaintiff sought to recover from the defendant 
irrigation district on a written contract. The lower court 
rendered judgment for plaintiff, notwithstanding testi-
mon:.· by three witnesses to the effect that plaintiff knew 
ancl agreed that his contract should not commence until 
defendant district obtained a loan. The loan was never 
ribtained. 
This court reversed the trial court finding for the 
plaintiff, and noted, with regard to the uncontroverted 
tPstimony of the witnesses: 
"The witnesses were not impeached nor their 
testimony in any particular discredited or contradicted 
or impaired. The court thus was not at liberty to dis-
regard it and make a finding contrary thereto, which 
in effect was done by finding that there was no such 
agreement or understanding as testified to by the 
witnesses. In other words, the district by undisputed 
evidence proved what this court on the first appeal 
said was a complete defense to plaintiff's cause, but 
the court by its finding disregarded such evidence and 
found contrary thereto; and hence it follows that the 
finding must be set aside and the judgment based upon 
it vacated." Parker at 13. 
In the case of American Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee, 120 
Utah 402, 235 P.2d 361 ( 1951), this court adopted the rule 
from another court: 
"The general rule as to the effect of positive un-
contradicted evidence is found in National Bank of 
Commerce of N. Y. v. Bottolfson, 55 S.D. 196, 225 
N.W. 385, 386, 69 A.L.R. 892, wherein the court said: 
"Where the testimony of a witness is uncontradicted 
and not inherently improbable, and there are no cir-
cumstances tending to raise a doubt of its truth, the 
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facts so prnven should be taken as conclusively estau-
lished and verdict directed or decision entel'ed accord-
ingly." American Scale at 364. (Emphasis added) 
The testimony of Lloyd M. Dalton was uncontroverted. 
The plaintiff not only failed to show that the bannister did 
not comply with the building code, but also introduced no 
testimony that would even imply that the bannister was 
negligently designed or constructed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING IN-
DIRECTLY INTO EVIDENCE THE FACT THAT DE-
FENDANT MADE REPAIRS TO THE BANNISTER 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE ACCIDENT. 
In March of 1966, two years after the accident, the 
defendant installed a wrought-iron addition to the ban-
nister over which Darren fell. The addition increased the 
height of the bannister by approximately 17 inches (R. 168). 
Before the trial began, counsel and the court agreed that 
evidence of such repairs was inadmissible (R. 168). How-
ever, during the cross-examination of Mr. Dennis Bar-
locker the plaintiff's attorney asked several times whether 
or not an extension could have been added to the bannister 
to prevent people from falling over it (R. 166). De-
fendant made a timely objection to this testimony (R. 170). 
The defendant contends that by allowing plaintiff to 
ask such questions, it put into evidence indirectly the fact 
that the defendant had put an extension on the bannister. 
Such questions were highly prejudicial and deprived the 
defendant of a fair trial. These questions accomplished 
indirectly the very thing that plaintiff's counsel admitted 
was contrary to law (R. 169). 
The rule of admissibility as to repairs that is followed 
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in the great majority of jurisdictions including Utah is 
well stated in Rule 51 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 
'\Vhen after the occurrence of an event remedial 
or precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken 
previously would have tended to make the event less 
likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures 
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable con-
duct in connection with the event. 
There are two persuasive reasons for this rule of evi-
dence. One is that because repairs are made, it does not 
follow that the condition was defective at the time of the 
accident. The other reason is that if such evidence were 
admitted, it would have a tendency to cause employers to 
omit making needed repairs for fear that the· precaution 
thus taken by them could be used as evidence against them. 
This court followed the general rule in the case of Pot-
ter v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hospital, 99 
Utah 71, 103 P.2d 280 (1940). Here suit was brought for 
the death of a hospital patient after she had fallen from 
her bed. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital was negli-
gent in not having sideboards on the patient's bed. This 
court held that the trial court should have granted defen-
dant's motion for a directed verdict because the evidence in 
the record failed to show negligence on the part of the 
defendant. 
After the accident sideboards were placed on the 
patient's bed. Plaintiffs asserted that due care required 
the hospital to use sideboards before the fall. To this 
contention the court stated: 
"Evidence of alterations or repairs to premises 
under his control made following an accident therein 
is inadmissible to show as against a defendant that 
the former condition was unsafe or was being negli-
gently maintained." Potter at 282. 
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See also Christensen v. Utah Rapid Tra1rnic Co., 83 
Utah 231, 27 P.2d 468 ( 1933), where this court said: 
"It is the gene!·al rule that where a dang2rous or 
defective appliance is alleged to have resulted in an 
injury for which damages are sought to be recovered, 
evidence that subsequent to the accident rha11qPs oi· 
repairs thereof or the1·eto were madr is i11ndmissih/p 
to show antecedent neqligence or as an admission of 
neg liq en re on the pm ·tiru ln r ocrasio11 in q 11esfio u, al-
though such evidence may be admissible for other nnr-
poses." Christensen at 474. (Emphasis 
While it is true that plaintiff did not specifically ask 
defendant's floor manager whether repairs had been made 
subsequent to the accident, the questions that were asked 
of Mr. Barlocker were equally prejudicial and produced 
the same effect. Mr. Barlocker \Vas asked three times by 
the plaintiff whether or not an extension could have been 
added to the bannister (R. 165, 166). The plaintiff made 
reference in his questions to the very type of extension 
that had in fact been added to the bannister. 
The questioning that took place on the part of the 
plaintiff was designed to introduce into evidence indirectly 
that which could not be introduced in Utah by direct evi-
dence. Such a tactic violates public policy in that it has the 
effect of discouraging a defendant from repairing or alter-
ing a condition that may cause another accident whether 
the defendant was quilty of negligence in the first instance 
or not. 
In Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F. 
2d 120 (6th Cir., 1955), the airline brought action against 
the aircraft manufacturer for alleged negligence in design 
and manufacture of airplanes. In the trial court the plain-
tiff attempted to introduce evidence as to modifications 
that defendant had made in the wing joint after the dam-
age was discovered. The evidence was introduced to show 
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how the wing should have been designed in the first place. 
The evidence was not admitted, and the Circuit Court up-
held the lower court. The appellate court held that the re-
sult of admitting the evidence would have been to provide 
a basis for inferring what should have been done. The 
court said: 
"This kind of hindsight evidence is not properly 
admissible upon the issue of ordinary care." Northwest 
at 130. 
In the case of Triplett v. Napier, 286 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 
1955), the plaintiff was injured in a fall on defendant's 
allegedly defective stairway. During depositions the plain-
tiff asked concerning subsequent repairs. Proper objec-
tions were made to these questions and answers which were 
sustained by the trial court. However, notwithstanding 
these objections, plaintiff on two separate occasions on 
cross-examination questioned witnesses on repairs. Both 
times objections were made and sustained. The appellate 
court said that such questions were: 
"* * * calculated to elicit answers from which the 
jury could learn, or infer, that such repairs had been 
made." 
In ruling that such questions were prejudicial, the court 
stated: 
"Such conduct with resulting argument is the 
evil sought to be avoided by the general rule, as is 
pointed out in the Kentucky & West Virginia Power 
Co. v. Stacy case. The continued and persistent efforts 
of appellee's counsel to bring the matter of the repairs 
to the attention of the jury after adverse rulings must 
be considered as prejudicial." Triplett at 89-90. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING OB-
JECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S PROFFERED EVI-
DENCE. 
During the direct examination of Mr. Dennis Bar-
locker, defendant asked the witness, 
"During the time that you have worked at the 
store, did work at the store, from 1961 up until the 
time of the accident, to your knowledge had there been 
any children or other people that had fallen over that 
stairs?" ( R. 155) 
Before the witness could answer, the plaintiff objected 
to the question as immaterial. Defendant then argued the 
point both in court and in chambers citing to the court the 
case of Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 31, 232 
P.2d 210 ( 1951) ( R. 155). After hearing argument the 
court sustained plaintiff's objection (R. 160). 
Defendant respectfully submits that the ruling of the 
trial court was prejudicial error. 
Defendant should have been allowed to introduce evi-
dence of the absence of prior accidents for two critical, in-
dependent reasons. In the first place such testimony would 
be evidence that the bannister was not a dangerous fixture 
in defendant's store, and, in the second place, the testi-
mony, if allowed, would have shown that the defendant had 
no notice of the allegedly dangerous condition. Such testi-
mony was critical to the defendant's case, and under Utah 
law should clearly have been admitted. 
In the case of Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., supra, 
the plaintiff sued the drug store for injuries suffered in a 
fall on a wet terrazzo floor in the entrance of the store. 
During the course of the trial the defendant attempted to 
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introduce evidence that approximately 4,000 to 5,000 per-
entered the drug store every day during the fifteen 
year:-; µnor to the accident and during that period of time 
the defendant had never received a single complaint or re-
port about anyone slipping on the terrazzo slab. The trial 
court excluded the testimony. This court held that such 
exclusion was error. In so holding the court said: 
"Evidence of the absence of accidents occurring 
prior to the accident complained of may not be ad-
missible to establish that an unsafe condition did not 
exist at the time of the accident in question. That 
matter we need not decide here. But such evidence is 
clearly admissible to prove that a possessor of l,and 
had no knowledge nor could he be charged with knowl-
Pd.qe that unsafe condition existed, particularly when 
the unsafe condition complained of is latent. In the 
instant case the appellant can only be liable if the 
terrazzo floor when wet subjected business visitors 
to an unreasonable risk and the appellant either knew 
or by the exercise of reasonable care could have dis-
covered that such a condition existed. Evidence that 
thousands of business visitors had walked through the 
entranceway in all kinds of weather and that none of 
them had ever complained to the appellant of slipping 
on the terrazzo slab, while not conclusive on the ques-
tion, as heretofore pointed out, does have probative 
value upon the question whether the appellant knew 
or should have known of the existence of an unreason-
able risk to customers entering and leaving the store." 
El'ickson at 214. (Emphasis added) 
The fact that there were no prior accidents involving 
the stairs or bannister was a circumstance that should have 
been considered by the jury in determining whether the 
bannister was dangerous and whether the defendant had 
any notice of a dangerous condition. 
The facts of the instant case and the Erickson case are 
very similar. In each case the defendant was a retail store 
14 
with the same legal obligations toward their cm.tomers. 
In both cases the dangerous condition, if one existed, was 
latent. In both cases the element of notice of a dangerous 
condition was an important element of the case. It is 
submitted that the Erickson case is controlling law in this 
case, and that the defendant should have been allowed to 
present evidence as to the absence of prior accidents. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully submits that the trial court 
erred in failing to grant its motion for a directed verdict. 
The trial court also committed prejudicial error in allow-
ing indirectly into evidence the fact that alterations had 
been made to the bannister and in not permitting defendant 
to introduce evidence showing the absence of prior acci-
dents. If this court does not grant defendant's motion for 
a directed verdict, it should grant a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER, Esq. 
M. JOHN ASHTON, Esq. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
